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What drives youth unemployment in Europe? 
 
Abstract: 
This article explores  the main determinants of youth unemployment  rates  in Europe  in  the period 
2002‐2014, by estimating panel data models on a unique dataset for 28 EU member countries. Taking 
into  account  heterogeneity  among  EU  countries,  models  are  also  estimated  on  two  different 
subsamples:  high  and  low  youth  unemployment  rate.  The  results  suggest  that  for  better 
understanding of the determinants of youth unemployment in Europe it is not only relevant to focus 
on traditional macroeconomic variables, but  it  is also  important to consider different structural and 
institutional  factors. Hence, main empirical  results  suggest  that  youth unemployment  in  the EU  is 
more  pronounced  in  countries with  poor GDP  growth,  low  share  of  construction  and  high  public 
debt. Low share of temporary employment and high perceived corruption also matter. Less mobility 
due  to  homeownership,  high  remittances  from  abroad,  low  work  intensity  of  other  household 
members or less possibilities for young people to live outside parental homes are also meaningful, at 
least for EU countries with comparatively high youth unemployment rates. These results could be of 
high  importance, especially when determining and evaluating different measures  taken  in order  to 
mitigate (high) youth unemployment rates in Europe. 
 
Key words: labour market, youth unemployment, panel data models, recession, Europe 
JEL Classification: J21, J64, C23 
 
 
 
Što pokreće nezaposlenost mladih u Europi? 
 
Sažetak: 
Ovaj članak istražuje glavne odrednice stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u Europi u razdoblju 2002.‐2014., 
ocjenom  panel  modela  na  jedinstvenom  skupu  podataka  za  28  članica  EU‐a.  Uzimajući  u  obzir 
heterogenost  zemalja  EU‐a,  modeli  su  dodatno  procijenjeni  na  dva  poduzorka:  uzorku  visokih  i 
uzorku  niskih  stopa  nezaposlenosti  mladih.  Rezultati  upućuju  na  to  da  za  bolje  razumijevanje 
odrednica  nezaposlenosti  mladih  u  Europi  nije  dovoljno  razmatrati  samo  tradicionalne 
makroekonomske  varijable,  već  je  važno  u  obzir  uzeti  i  različite  strukturne  i  institucionalne 
čimbenike. U tom kontekstu, glavni empirijski rezultati pokazuju da  je nezaposlenost mladih u EU‐u 
izraženija u zemljama sa slabim rastom BDP‐a, niskim udjelom građevine  i visokim  javnim dugom u 
gospodarstvu.  Nizak  udio  privremenog  zapošljavanja  i  visoka  razina  korupcije  također  su  važni  u 
objašnjavanju  visoke  stope  nezaposlenosti  mladih.  Manja  mobilnost  zbog  vlasništva  nad 
nekretninama za stanovanje, visoki udio doznaka iz inozemstva, nizak intenzitet rada ostalih članova 
kućanstva  ili manje mogućnosti za život  izvan roditeljskog doma  također su važni, barem za zemlje 
EU‐a  s  relativno  visokim  stopama  nezaposlenosti  mladih.  Ovi  rezultati  mogli  bi  biti  vrlo  važni, 
posebice  prilikom  dizajniranja  i  evaluacije  različitih  mjera  za  ublažavanje  (visokih)  stopa 
nezaposlenosti mladih u Europi. 
 
Ključne riječi: tržište rada, nezaposlenost mladih, panel modeli, recesija, Europa 
JEL klasifikacija: J21, J64, C23 
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Introduction1 
 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007/2008, followed by a Great Recession in 2008/2009, hit 
some European countries more than others. Countries such as Greece, Croatia or Spain 
experienced the strongest and the longest setback whereas countries such as Germany 
recovered very quickly. The consequences of the recession are strongly demonstrated on the 
labour markets of European countries. Regardless of the overall unfavourable economic 
conditions, some groups of the population have been hit by the recession much more than the 
others. Among them, young people are particularly affected, which is evidenced in high rates and 
long-term unemployment ever since the beginning of the crisis in many European countries. 
 
More than 5 million young people under 25 were unemployed in the EU-28 in 2014, which 
represents almost 10 percent of the entire population of that age and more than 20 percent of 
the entire EU-28 unemployed population. Although youth unemployment rate is generally 
higher than the overall unemployment rate, even in periods of economic growth, after the 
outbreak of the crisis, youth unemployment rate has been growing more rapidly than the overall 
rate. On average, the unemployment rate for the population aged 15-24 increased by 6.6 
percentage points between 2008 and 2014 (from 15.6 to 22.2 percent) in the EU as a whole, 
whereas the “adult” (25-64) unemployment rate increased by merely 3.1 percentage points, 
amounting to 9.1 percent in 2014.2 The differences between countries are striking. In countries 
such as Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain the youth unemployment rate increased by more 
than 20 percentage points in the same period, reaching over 50 percent in Greece and Spain in 
2014. In Germany, on the other hand, youth unemployment rate actually decreased in the 
observed period, by 2.7 percentage points, amounting to 7.7 percent in 2014.  
 
Risk of unemployment for youths is typically higher than for adults for several different reasons. 
These include the lack of work experience, relatively short or incomplete education, greater 
instability of the contractual relationship, and fewer contacts for job search. There is also a 
problem of difficult transition from education to the world of work due to skills mismatch. All 
this can cause long-lasting negative effects for the youth population, or indirect costs for the 
unemployed individuals, in the form of the so-called "scarring effect" (Scarpetta et al., 2010; Bell 
and Blanchflower, 2011; Eichhorst et al., 2013a). Namely, even when they get employed youths 
are usually “trapped” at the bottom of the labour market; they have less on-the-job training; 
lower wage levels; weaker prospects for long-standing employment and career advancement, 
which reduces their lifetime earnings; higher risk of income poverty and deterioration of their 
human and social capital; risk of long-term unemployment; high risk of social exclusion and even 
risk of engaging in criminal activities (O’Higgins, 2015). Nevertheless, not only does high youth 
unemployment cause costs for individuals but it can also bring costs for the society as a whole 
(Eichhorst et al., 2013a; O’Higgins, 2015). These come in the form of reduced efficiency of 
                                                            
1 This paper received the 2015 Olga Radzyner Award from the Austrian Central Bank (OeNB). 
The paper is part of the project ZAMAH ­ The Impact of the Recession on the Structure and Flow of Youth Unemployment 
in Croatia (HR.3.2.01-0136) that has been funded with support from the European Social Fund (ESF).  
The author would like to thank her friends and colleagues, Ana Grdović Gnip and Marina Tkalec, for their comments 
and suggestions at the early stage of this research and for the help with the methodological part of the research. The 
author would also like to thank two members of the editorial board of EIZ Working Papers, as well as Andrea Mervar, 
for their useful comments and suggestions in the process of publishing this paper.  
The paper reflects the views only of the author and none of the institutions or persons cited above cannot be held 
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. 
2 Based on official Eurostat data. 
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investment in education and training, shrinking taxation base, higher welfare costs, but also in 
the form of possible protests or social unrests and the so-called “brain drain” or emigration of 
highly skilled young people which reduces future potential economic growth in a specific 
country. Therefore, it is no surprise that youth unemployment is highlighted as one of the most 
pressing problems of the European society nowadays. 
 
The problem of youth unemployment can be tackled at different levels and in different ways. 
However, before establishing which programs and measures have the best outcome, deeper 
analysis of the problem should be conducted. The existing literature covers the issues of youth 
unemployment in Europe rather well (Chung et al., 2012; ILO, 2012a; Eichhorst et al., 2013a; 
Eurofound, 2014). Still, most of the (empirical) literature is focused on the impact of the recent 
recession on the youth unemployment (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011; O'Higgins, 2012; Banerji et 
al., 2014), often neglecting the fact that some countries are struggling with this phenomenon for 
a longer period of time. Therefore, this article tries to fill in this gap by examining the main 
determinants of youth unemployment in European countries in a longer perspective, including 
the Great Recession. The analysis uses data for 28 EU countries in the period 2002-2014, and by 
panel data models explores what are the main features that cause high youth unemployment 
rates, as well as their persistence, in many EU countries. Since cross-country comparisons in 
previous studies (Brada and Signorelli, 2012; Boeri and Jimeno, 2015) show that there are 
considerable differences between countries within the EU, we take this into account by 
estimating models on two different subsamples: high  youth unemployment  rate countries and 
low  youth  unemployment  rate countries. Additionally, besides the generally accepted (macro) 
indicators that have proved to be important in explaining high (youth) unemployment rates, we 
assess whether larger set of data, including different institutional and structural factors, could 
bring some new insights into the subject of youth unemployment in Europe. Variables such as 
corruption perception or family work history legacies could provide additional information 
when trying to solve the problem of youth unemployment in a specific country or group of 
countries. The share of home ownership or living in a parental home for a longer period further 
suggest that cultural differences between countries within the EU could also have an impact on 
the level of youth unemployment. 
 
Thus, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the paper examines longer-term 
determinants of youth unemployment among EU member states, including the recent crisis, in 
order to explore the extent of the persistence of the problem in some of the countries. Second, 
the paper acknowledges heterogeneity between countries, and especially their labour markets, 
by estimating the models separately for countries that have experienced long periods of high 
youth unemployment and countries that had much less to worry regarding this issue in the last 
13 years. Third contribution comes from the acknowledgement that specific, non-economic, 
characteristics could help to explain high youth unemployment rates in some of the EU 
countries. Hence, the results of the paper are of policy relevance as well. Taking into account 
different economic and non-economic characteristics of each country and acknowledging that 
they behave in a different manner, together with the recognition that this issue is not only crisis-
related, should help design the policy measures to combat this problem on both EU and national 
level.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows. After introduction, the second section briefly reviews 
relevant studies, covering main issues regarding youth unemployment in Europe, especially 
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after the start of the recent recession. The next section describes the sample of the data used as 
well as the variables used in the empirical analysis, building up on the findings from the 
literature. After that, the fourth section gives a short discussion of the main empirical strategy, 
i.e., panel data model estimation. Fifth section presents the results of the econometric 
estimation, including the robustness tests that assess the model on different dependent 
variables. It also includes a more detailed discussion of the obtained results, putting them in the 
context of the existing literature but also providing some new insights on this matter. Finally, 
concluding section provides a summary of the main results and points to areas where the 
obtained results could be of great value. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
The problem of youth unemployment has been on the agenda in the labour economics literature 
for a long time (for instance, Freeman and Wise, 1982 or O’Higgins, 2001). However, after the 
start of the recent recession there have been many studies investigating the size and the scope of 
high youth unemployment in different EU countries (Chung et al., 2012; ILO, 2012a; Eichhorst et 
al., 2013a; Caporale and Gil-Alana, 2014; Eurofound, 2014; Dolado, 2015), the impact of the 
recession on youth unemployment movements (OECD, 2010; O'Higgins, 2010, 2012; Bell and 
Blanchflower, 2011; Bruno et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2012; Banerji et al., 2014; van Ours, 2015), 
the impact of ALMPs and other measures to mitigate this phenomenon (Scarpetta et al., 2010; 
Biavaschi et al., 2012; Chung et al., 2012, Eichhorst et al., 2013a; Banerji et al., 2014; Caliendo 
and Schmidl, 2015), or studies that try to establish some patterns which could explain why this 
problem exists in the first place (Choudhry et al., 2012). 
 
For example, Choudhry et al. (2012) evaluate the impact of financial crises on youth 
unemployment rate in the period 1980-2005 and conclude that financial crises have an impact 
on youth unemployment rates that goes beyond the impact resulting from GDP changes, as well 
as that the effect on the youth unemployment rate is greater than the effect on overall 
unemployment. Caporale and Gil-Alana (2014) further show that youth unemployment is highly 
persistent in all of the 15 European countries studied in the period from 1980 to 2005, with GDP 
and inflation coming out as the most important factors in explaining it. Eichhorst et al. (2013b) 
show that youth unemployment rates have increased twice as strongly as the rates of older 
workers between 2008 and 2011, especially in countries where unemployment for older 
workers also increased strongly, countries with large construction sectors, and countries that 
have implemented two-tier reforms of employment protection.  
 
When trying to define factors behind high youth unemployment in European countries the 
literature suggests different theories and empirical evidence. Brada et al. (2014), for instance, 
review key theories and some new empirical evidence on youth unemployment and state that 
there are three groups of determinants behind it: (i) cyclical conditions, (ii) demographic, 
individual, social and structural conditions, and (iii) policies and institutions. They emphasize 
how youth unemployment is more sensitive to cyclical movements than the adult one, mostly 
because of the lower qualifications, less experience and weaker work contracts among young 
workers. Out of the second group, they point to migration flows, preference of workers, 
including longer stay or return to education during recession, ties with parents, barriers to 
regional mobility, and structure of the economy (industry vs. services) as the most important 
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determinants of youth unemployment. Besides labour taxes, unemployment benefits, education 
system, employment protection legislation and active labour market policies, they stress out the 
importance of the minimum wages and the extent of temporary contracts among the third group 
of youth unemployment determinants.  
 
O’Reilly et al. (2015) go even further and name five main categories, characteristic for the 
current period and different from those in earlier periods of high youth unemployment in 
Europe: (i) universality of labour market flexibility, preventing young people to secure stable 
employment trails; (ii) skills mismatch, i.e., immense expansion of education in Europe that has 
not been aligned to the changing structure of the demand for skills by employers; (iii) youth 
migration within the EU that has been “more extensive, selective, and diversified than in 
previous recessions”; (iv) family work history legacies which bring new forms of polarization for 
younger generations; and (v) increased EU policy initiatives and investments that depend on the 
ability of national actors to implement them effectively.  
 
Biavaschi et al. (2012), while explaining differences in youths’ transition into employment, 
emphasize the importance of demographic factors and economic growth, but also long-standing 
institutional arrangements, especially the degree of flexibilization on the labour market and 
education and training policies. Bertola et al. (2013) also stress the importance of the 
institutional characteristics, explaining how they significantly affect the level and the cyclical 
sensitivity of youth unemployment, with a relatively greater impact on rigid labour markets. 
O’Higgins (2012), on the other hand, argues that labour market flexibility contributed 
significantly to the loss of employment for youths on the labour market during recent recession. 
Bell and Blanchflower (2011) emphasize the lack of demand as the primary cause behind the 
recent rise in unemployment. Also, they show that polarization of the labour market, by 
changing the structure of labour demand, may negatively affect young people's labour market 
prospects.  
 
Aside from determining main causes of high youth unemployment in Europe a large strand of 
the literature proposes different policy measures to deal with this issue or to evaluate measures 
already in place (Scarpetta et al., 2010; Bertola et al, 2013; Eichhorst et al. 2013a; Brada et al., 
2014). Namely, the European Union pays a lot of attention to youth unemployment (and 
inactivity) by initiating different sets of programs and measures. These include, for example, 
Youth on the Move initiative, the Youth Guarantee or the Youth Employment Initiative (EC, 2013). 
Although these policy initiatives are of a newer date, they mainly arise from different sets of 
ALMP measures that were in place years before the recent crisis. However, their success was 
highly questioned in many studies (for example, Kluve, 2006; Card et al. 2015; Caliendo and 
Schmidl, 2015). Also, these programs cost, while their final impact is not entirely known. For 
example, ILO (2012b), in its publication on Eurozone job crisis, reports that the total estimated 
cost of establishing Youth Guarantee schemes in the Eurozone is €21bn per year, or 0.22 percent 
of GDP.3 Eurofound (2012), on the other hand, estimates that young people not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) cost the EU €153bn or 1.21 percent of GDP per year – in benefits 
and foregone earnings and taxes.  
 
                                                            
3 Eichhorst et al. (2013a) and Bergin et al. (2015) are some of the studies that question the effectiveness of the Youth 
Guarantee. 
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Thus, programmes and measures initiated to combat problems of youth unemployment at both 
EU and national levels have not proved to be entirely efficient. It might be that this is because the 
measures and programmes are not well targeted, i.e., they do not “attack” the root of the 
problem. As evident in this section, the literature suggests that different kind of factors could be 
held responsible for the level of youth unemployment in Europe, as well as its immense growth 
in the recent recession. Depending on the period and set of countries observed, different 
determinants of (high) youth unemployment appear. Hence, this paper tries to fill in the gap in 
the literature by combining different sets of possible determinants of youth unemployment 
stemming from the existing literature into one model. Besides the commonly accepted 
determinants of youth unemployment in European countries, this paper also empirically tests 
youth unemployment rate in EU member states on additional variables that could have been 
responsible for high youth unemployment rates in many European countries, but are not usually 
examined in the literature. These include, for instance, perceived corruption, homeownership, 
high remittances, or work intensity of other household members. Thus, not only 
(macro)economic factors are examined as those responsible for high youth unemployment rates 
in Europe, but institutional and even cultural variables are also investigated. Moreover, we do 
not focus only on the impact of recent crisis on the movements on youth unemployment in 
Europe, but also take into account a period before and after the Great Recession. 
 
 
Sample selection and data description 
Sample selection 
 
Our sample consists of EU-28 member countries in the period of 13 years, i.e., from 2002 to 
2014. The main reason for this is the rather abundant data availability for these countries, which 
cannot be said for most of the other European countries, especially EU candidate and other 
countries belonging to the south-eastern part of Europe. This specific time-period is chosen for 
the same reason; during this period most of the data used in the empirical estimation were 
available in case of the majority of EU member countries. Besides, the goal of the paper is not the 
evaluation of the situation only after the start of the crisis, but the search for factors that 
influence (high) youth unemployment rates for a longer period of time. 
 
Still, it is hard to expect the “one-size-fits-all” situation, or that all of these countries behave in 
the same way regarding their youth unemployment. Although the youth unemployment rate 
recently rose in almost all European countries, the situation is still quite heterogeneous (Figure 
1). In order to test the hypothesis that different (groups) EU countries behave in a different way 
regarding their youth unemployment rates, we further divided our entire sample into two 
subsamples: (i) high youth unemployment rate countries and (ii) low youth unemployment rate 
countries. The criteria for this were the average youth unemployment rates during a longer 
period (2002-2014) which should indicate whether these countries have been struggling with 
this issue for a longer time or whether this is just a short-term consequence of the recent 
recession.4 The first, or high youth unemployment rate, group consists of 15 countries: Croatia, 
                                                            
4 The mean youth unemployment rate for the age group 15-24 in EU-28 in the analysed period (2002-2014) is 20.6 
percent (Figure 1 and Table 1). Calculating the average youth unemployment rates in the observed period for each 
country separately, the sample of the so-called high youth unemployment rate countries is obtained, with mean youth 
unemployment rate of 25.6 percent. The sample of the so-called low youth unemployment rate countries has the mean 
youth unemployment rate of 14.7 percent; below the mean for the entire sample (Figure 1). 
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Greece, Spain, Slovakia, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Lithuania, Finland, 
France, Sweden, and Hungary, while the second, or low youth unemployment rate, group consist 
of 13 countries: Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Malta, Germany, Denmark, Austria and Netherlands. Evidently, in both 
groups there is a mix of the “old” and the “new” member states, Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
member states, Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean countries, etc. The main thing that 
connects countries within a group is their average youth unemployment rate in the period 2002-
2014. 
 
Figure 1 Average youth (15­24) unemployment rates in the EU (2002­2014) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
Additionally, not only are these two groups of countries differentiated by their average youth 
unemployment rate in the period 2002-2014, but also by other aspects of their labour markets. 
For instance, they also differ by the ratio of youth (15-24) and adult (25-64) unemployment rate, 
as well as the dynamics of this ratio in the observed period (Figure 2). The average ratio in high 
youth unemployment rate countries was 2.9 in the observed period, with a peak of 3.0 in 2008. In 
low youth unemployment rate countries, on the other hand, the average ratio amounted to 2.6, 
with a peak of 2.8, again in 2008. These differences might not seem pronounced, but the test of 
statistical differences between mean values of the ratio in each group (t-test) shows that 
difference of this ratio between two groups of countries is significant at one percent level, the 
same as the difference between youth unemployment rates. The movement of the ratio seems 
rather similar to the one for the overall EU-28 sample, indicating its fall back towards its 2002-
level in 2014 for both “high” and “low” subsample. However, these levels indicate that youth 
unemployment rate is, on average, still more than 2.5 times higher than the adult unemployment 
rate, while in the crisis (2008) this was closer to 3 times, especially in high youth unemployment 
rate countries. 
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Figure 2 Average ratio of youth (15­24) and adult (25­64) unemployment rates in the EU  
 
Notes: YUR – youth (15-24) unemployment rate; AUR – adult (25-64) unemployment rate.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
Data description 
 
As already mentioned, our dataset includes annual observations stretching from 2002 to 2014. 
The main dependent variable is youth unemployment rate for the age group 15-24,5 while the 
adult (25-64) unemployment rate and youth NEET rate on the same set of independent variables 
are also estimated. As for the independent variables, variables that were selected from the 
literature as those that affect unemployment, and especially youth unemployment rates, are 
used, but with the addition of some supplementary variables in order to test more specific 
characteristics of the countries in question that might lie behind high youth unemployment 
rates.  
 
First, overall economic situation in the country is proxied by real GDP growth rate. Naturally, it 
is expected that positive (and high) GDP growth rates lead to a decrease of unemployment rates, 
as well as youth NEET rate. However, the effect on youth unemployment rate should be stronger 
than the one on the adult rate given that youth unemployment is strongly procyclical (Eichhorst 
et al. 2013b; Banerji et al., 2014; Brada et al. 2014; Bruno et al., 2014; Hutengs and Stadtmann, 
2014). Also, this effect is expected to be stronger in countries with higher average youth 
unemployment rates. In a way, this variable captures the effect of the recession, as well as labour 
demand. Moreover, one should control for the structure of the economy, which is done by using 
the following variables: share of exports in GDP, share of agriculture in GVA, share of industry in 
GVA, and share of construction in GVA. Brada et al. (2014) emphasise that the structure of the 
economy (industry vs. services) is very important in explaining youth unemployment. It has 
already been mentioned (Eichhorst et al., 2013b) that youth unemployment rate is shown to be 
higher, at least in the recent period, in countries with higher share of the construction sector. 
Banerji et al. (2014) even explain how youth employment is usually concentrated in cyclically 
                                                            
5 The most commonly accepted definition of youth unemployment (see Eurostat). 
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sensitive sectors of the economy, such as construction, which could additionally explain why 
youth unemployment is almost three times more sensitive to growth than adult unemployment. 
Similar applies for industrial sector. Higher share of exports should work in the opposite 
direction, whereas high share of agriculture should indicate the backwardness of the country 
and probably higher youth unemployment rates.6 
 
We are using the share of public debt in GDP as a control variable for the state of public finances, 
namely the proxy for the capability of the government to fight (high) unemployment. As stated 
by O’Reilly et al. (2015), increased EU policy initiatives and investments are highly dependent on 
the ability of national actors to implement them effectively, which is also under the influence of 
the total burden the government has. Additionally, labour costs are proxied by tax rate which 
should have a negative impact on youth unemployment. It is generally perceived that labour 
taxes should impede the growth of employment (Tomić and Grdović Gnip, 2011); however, this 
could be even more present in the case of youths. Given that young workers are relatively 
unskilled, even when highly educated, if the cost of their hiring is deemed to be too high, the 
employers will be reluctant to employ them. This is especially true in those countries that have 
rather high tax rates at relatively low level of wages.7 Skills structure of the labour should affect 
unemployment as well, so we also control for the share of highly educated population within the 
entire labour force (15-64).  
 
As for the institutional obstacles, the rigidity of the labour legislation is most frequently used in 
the literature when explaining high unemployment in Europe (Siebert, 1997; Layard and Nickell, 
1999; Boeri et al., 2012; Bertola et al. 2013; Biavaschi et al., 2012). As the most commonly used 
proxy for the rigidity of labour legislation – employment protection legislation index (EPL) - is 
not available for all EU countries and since it alters only with legislation changes, in order to 
control for the “flexibility” of the labour market in each country we used the share of temporary 
employment contracts among the total employment (15-64). It is assumed that larger share of 
temporary contracts among the employed population indicates more flexible labour market and 
thus easier employment of younger people. However, this indicator could also suggest that the 
country has had two-tier labour market reforms and that it functions as a dual labour market 
which should work against the decrease of both the youth and adult unemployment rate.8 
Furthermore, non-labour income is generally used as an obstacle to higher employment, 
especially for youths (Banerji et al., 2014). Usually, unemployment benefits are considered as 
the culprit for longer spells and higher rates of unemployment. However, young people are 
typically not entitled to unemployment benefits (Scarpetta et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2012) so in 
                                                            
6 However, this does not have to hold, as in some countries with high share of agricultural activities in the economy, 
such as Albania or Romania; the official unemployment rates are not very high. However, there is probably high share 
of underemployment in these countries. 
7 Although minimum wage is often considered to have a highly negative effect on youth unemployment (Banerji et al., 
2014; Brada et al., 2014), we do not use the minimum wage (as a proportion of the average wage) in our model 
estimations due to the fact that some countries (such as Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, or 
Sweden) do not have the institution of the minimum wage at all or during most of the observed period and thus would 
be left out of the analysis. Correlation coefficients between the share of the minimum wage in the average wage (for 
those EU countries that do have minimum wage) and youth unemployment, adult unemployment and NEET rate for 
the entire sample are: -0.25, -0.26, and -0.28, respectively. The same correlation coefficients for the “high” sample are: 
-0.17, -0.15, and -0.21, and for the “low” sample: -0.16, -0.22, and -0.19. 
8 O’Higgins (2012), for example, argues that youths have been particularly strongly hit during the recent recession and 
that temporary contracts have become the dominant contract type for newly established contracts of young people, 
with the problem of segmented labour markets being particularly severe in Mediterranean countries. 
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this case we use personal remittances (as % of GDP) as an indicator that should serve as a proxy 
for non-labour income.9 Finally, in order to control for demographic trends, we use the median 
age of the population. Both the level and the rate of youth unemployment should depend on the 
overall age structure of the population (Biavaschi et al., 2012). Obviously, some European 
countries are facing demographic ageing, whereas others have higher share of younger 
population. Median age of the population is expected to negatively influence youth 
unemployment. In countries with higher median age of the population there is a lower number 
of young people and thus their unemployment rate could be higher. In case of the adult 
unemployment rate, median age of the population should have the opposite effect.  
 
Besides these, generally accepted factors behind high youth unemployment rates, additional 
variables that could be responsible for high youth unemployment rates in many European 
countries, but are not usually examined in the literature are used in this paper.  First, 
institutional variables, i.e., Corruption Perception Index (CPI); Economic Freedom Index for 
regulation and two dummy variables indicating policy change: a change within the retirement 
legislation that limited/decreased eligibility for early retirement, i.e., should have prolonged the 
working life, and a change within the employment protection legislation that increased the EPL 
index are included. Apart from those, we also include additional variables that should further 
control for specific characteristics of each country, particularly related to youth unemployment. 
These include: share of young people (15-24) living in households with very low work intensity; 
share of home ownership within a population and the share of young people (20-29) still living 
with their parents.  
 
The effect of corruption on unemployment is not that straightforward, but the effects of 
corruption on other economic indicators are examined rather well in the literature (for example, 
in Tanzi, 1998; Lambsdorff, 2006; Swaleheen, 2007; or Budak and Vizek, 2015). It is thus 
expected that the corruption has a negative effect on employment, i.e., that the estimated 
coefficient associated to perceived corruption will have a negative sign, suggesting that the 
smaller the CPI score (the larger the perceived corruption), the higher the unemployment rate. 
Also, there are some indications (Arandarenko and Nojkovic, 2010) that youth unemployment 
rate is higher in countries with higher share of the public sector. We could not test for that in the 
paper due to data unavailability for all the countries, but the size of the corruption, even as a 
subjective measure, could control for this effect as well. As mentioned previously, it is difficult to 
evaluate institutional or policy deficits since they are not something that changes on a regular 
(yearly) level. In this instance, we use the data from the Fraser Institute on the sub-index for 
regulation of the so-called Economic Freedom Index. It is expected that (youth) unemployment 
will be higher in countries with more regulatory obstacles on credit and labour markets, as well 
as business practices.10 More regulation in general means more costs for the business and, thus, 
fewer incentives to hire new (young) people. Additional policy variables are obtained from the 
LABREF database11 on some of the reforms conducted in EU-member states, namely, an 
indication of the decreased eligibility for early retirement and a change in labour legislation that 
should have increased the rigidity of the labour market. It is expected that both of these 
variables increase youth unemployment rate. The effect of the dummy variable indicating 
                                                            
9 Additionally, this variable controls for migration effects. 
10 Besides labour market and overall business regulations, credit constraints are also mentioned in the literature as 
one of the culprits for high youth unemployment (for instance, Kolev & Saget, 2005). 
11 More on the LABREF database see in Turrini et al. (2015). 
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increasing rigidity on the labour market is already motivated, however; the effect of the dummy 
variable showing decreased eligibility for early retirement is somewhat puzzling. It is assumed 
that since older workers are required to stay on the labour market for a longer time, there will 
be no replacement demand, i.e., no new workplaces for the younger generation. All these 
variables represent institutional characteristics of a specific country. Although often cited as the 
main obstacles in increasing employment, they are rarely tested in empirical analyses, mostly 
due to measurement issues. That is why we try to overcome this gap by adding these specific 
institutional variables in our estimation of youth unemployment determinants in EU member 
states. 
 
Finally, young people whose parents or other household members are unemployed (for various 
reasons) will generally find it much harder to get employment or even be willing to search for 
one. The negative impact of home ownership on the level (and rate) of unemployment is a 
hypothesis present in the literature for a long time (Oswald, 1996, 1999; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2013), although the empirical results are mixed. In general, higher home ownership 
should increase the level of unemployment, and not only for the reason of sustained mobility of 
workers. Namely, it is argued that high share of home ownership leads to the lack of rental 
housing sector which means that the unemployed cannot easily move into the regions/cities 
where there are jobs, which especially affects young people (Oswald, 1996, 1999). Using the 
share of young people (20-29) still living with their parents as a control variable could be 
questionable from the standpoint of simultaneity effect. However, we argue that, when 
explaining “mentality” or cultural differences between European countries, this variable is just 
as important as the home ownership variable. Hence the expectation is that it should have a 
stronger effect in countries with higher average youth unemployment rate.  
 
Most of the data used in this paper are provided by Eurostat (Table 1). Exceptions are personal 
remittances for which the source is the World Bank database – World Development Indicators; 
dummy policy variables are obtained from the LABREF database provided by the European 
Commission; the CPI score from the Transparency International; and Economic Freedom Index 
for regulation is obtained from the Fraser Institute. Table 1 shows details of all the data we have 
used, for the total sample, as well as for the two subsamples based on the height of their average 
youth unemployment rate. Due to some missing values, the panel of all samples is unbalanced. 
 
At first sight, one can observe higher average real GDP growth rates in countries that exhibit 
higher average youth unemployment rates (Table 1). However, these countries also have much 
lower share of exports of goods and services in their GDP and higher shares of non-service 
activities (agriculture, industry and construction12) in gross value added. On average, tax rate is 
lower in countries with higher youth unemployment rates, whereas the share of those skilled 
among the labour force is expectedly lower. On the other hand, the share of temporary 
employment contracts and received personal remittances is significantly higher in countries 
with higher average youth unemployment rate. Median age of the population is only slightly 
higher in these countries as well. 
Comparing the high  youth  unemployment  rate countries with low  youth  unemployment  rate 
countries one can see that high  youth  unemployment  rate  countries have, on average, higher 
share of young people living in households with very low work intensity; higher share of home 
                                                            
12 Although one could argue that the construction sector is not entirely non-service activity, it is most-commonly 
perceived as a wider part of the industrial sector, i.e., strictly separated from the service sector (see Eurostat). 
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ownership within a population; and higher share of young people (20-29) still living with their 
parents. Also, they have lower value for CPI score, i.e., higher perception of corruption; lower 
Economic Freedom Index for regulation, i.e., more regulation within credit and labour markets, 
as well as within business practices; and more reforms within both the retirement legislation 
and the employment protection legislation. The use of these variables is an additional reason for 
dividing the entire sample into two subsamples since it is expected that some of the variables 
are irrelevant for the amount of youth unemployment in some countries but could be of high 
importance in other countries.13 Unfortunately, not all of the data were available for all the 
countries in all observed years, and thus, the estimated sample becomes smaller when adding 
these supplementary variables into estimation. 
                                                            
13 Naturally, there are other variables that affect the youth unemployment, but the data availability for use in a 
comparative manner precludes us from using more extensive dataset. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics and data sources 
Total  High YUR  Low YUR 
Variable  Obs. Mean St. Dv. Obs. Mean St. Dv. Obs. Mean St. Dv. Description  Source 
youth unemployment 
rate (15-24) (%) 364 20.57 (9.62) 195 25.62 (9.23) 169 14.75 (6.18) 
Young people (15-24) not employed but actively 
searching for a job (unemployed) as % of total active 
(employed + unemployed) population in that age group. 
Eurostat 
adult unemployment 
rate (25-64) (%) 364 7.72 (3.95) 195 9.40 (4.21) 169 5.79 (2.50) 
Adults (25-64) not employed but actively searching for a 
job (unemployed) as % of total active (employed + 
unemployed) population in that age group. 
Eurostat 
ratio of youth and adult 
unemployment rate 364 2.76 (0.69) 195 2.87 (0.65) 169 2.63 (0.71) 
Ratio of youth (15-24) and adult (25-64) unemployment 
rate. 
Author’s 
calculation based 
on Eurostat data 
NEET rate (15-24) (%) 364 11.88 (4.66) 195 13.94 (4.38) 169 9.51 (3.77) 
Young people (15-24) neither in employment nor in 
education and training as % of total population in that 
age group. 
Eurostat 
real GDP growth rate 
(%) 364 1.95 (3.74) 195 2.07 (4.11) 169 1.81 (3.27) 
To measure the growth rate of GDP in terms of volumes, 
GDP at current prices is valued in the prices of the 
previous year and thus computed volume changes are 
imposed on the level of a reference year. 
Eurostat 
share of exports in GDP 
(%) 362 57.66 (34.10) 193 43.00 (18.29) 169 74.39 (39.85) Exports of goods and services as % of GDP. Eurostat 
share of agriculture in 
GVA (%) 364 2.81 (1.94) 195 3.80 (2.05) 169 1.67 (0.89) 
Share of agriculture gross value added in total gross 
value added (%). Eurostat 
share of industry in 
GVA (%) 364 20.70 (5.66) 195 21.39 (4.74) 169 19.89 (6.48) 
Share of industry (except construction) gross value 
added in total gross value added (%). Eurostat 
share of construction in 
GVA (%) 364 6.48 (1.81) 195 6.81 (1.82) 169 6.10 (1.72) 
Share of construction gross value added in total gross 
value added (%). Eurostat 
share of public debt in 
GDP (%) 364 55.30 (32.04) 195 57.36 (34.52) 169 52.92 (28.83) Share of general government debt in GDP (%). Eurostat 
tax rate (%) 357 27.53 (7.20) 195 26.38 (4.67) 162 28.92 (9.21) 
Income tax on gross wage earnings plus the employee's 
social security contributions less universal cash benefits, 
expressed as a % of gross wage earnings. 
Eurostat 
skilled labour force (15-
64) (%) 364 26.42 (8.13) 195 24.34 (7.47) 169 28.81 (8.23) 
Share of active population (15-64) with tertiary 
education (ISCED levels 5-8) in total active population 
(15-64). 
Eurostat 
temporary employment 
(15-64) (%) 364 11.22 (6.70) 195 12.67 (7.84) 169 9.54 (4.57) 
Temporary employees as % of the total number of 
employees (15-64). Eurostat 
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Total  High YUR  Low YUR 
Variable  Obs. Mean St. Dv. Obs. Mean St. Dv. Obs. Mean St. Dv. Description  Source 
personal remittances 
(% of GDP) 353 1.26 (1.26) 187 1.57 (1.44) 166 0.92 (0.90) 
Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and 
compensation of employees made or received by resident 
households to or from non-resident household. Data are 
the sum of two items.  
WB,  World 
Development 
Indicators 
median age  364 39.62 (2.29) 195 39.94 (2.06) 169 39.25 (2.50) Median age of the population. Eurostat 
CPI score 361 6.30 (1.85) 195 5.48 (1.82) 166 7.27 (1.34) 
Corruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency 
International. The CPI currently ranks countries "on a 
scale from 10(100) (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
Scores for the period 2012-2014 were adjusted to fit the 
scale from 1 to 10. 
Transparency 
International 
economic freedom 
index - regulation 336 7.22 (0.58) 180 7.09 (0.53) 156 7.37 (0.60) 
Economic freedom index covering regulation. Other areas 
include: Size of Government; Legal System & Property 
Rights; Sound Money and Freedom to trade 
internationally. Regulation sub-index includes: Credit 
market regulations; Labour market regulations and 
Business regulations (Gwartney et al., 2015). 
Fraser Institute 
early retirement 
decrease 364 0.29 (0.45) 195 0.32 (0.47) 169 0.25 (0.43) 
Dummy variable indicating change within the retirement 
legislation that limited/decreased eligibility for early 
retirement, i.e., should have prolonged the working life. 
Valued at the time (year) of implementation. 
LABREF 
database,  DG 
EMPL,  European 
Commission 
EPL increase 364 0.10 (0.31) 195 0.14 (0.35) 169 0.06 (0.24) 
Dummy variable indicating change within the 
employment protection legislation that increased the EPL 
index. Valued at the time (year) of implementation. 
LABREF 
database,  DG 
EMPL,  European 
Commission 
low work intensity HH 
(15-24) (%) 257 8.22 (3.72) 134 8.25 (3.01) 123 8.18 (4.38) 
Young people (15-24) living in households with very low 
work intensity. Eurostat 
home ownership (%) 265 76.14 (9.83) 140 79.94 (9.55) 125 71.88 (8.28) % of home ownership within a population. Eurostat 
living with parents (20-
29) (%) 257 55.91 (18.96) 134 59.04 (20.10) 123 52.49 (17.05) 
Share of young people (20-29) living with their parents 
as % of total population in that age group. Eurostat 
 
EU­28: BE, BG, CZ, DK, 
DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, 
HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, 
HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, 
RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK 
EU­15: HR, EL, ES, SK, 
PL, IT, BG, LV, PT, RO, 
LT, FI, FR, SE, HU 
EU­13: BE, EE, IE, CY, 
CZ, UK, LU, SI, MT, DE, 
DK, AT, NL 
  
Notes: YUR – youth (15-24) unemployment rate.  
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Empirical strategy 
 
Empirical strategy in this paper is based on rather simple panel data model estimation: 
ititiit XYUR    (1) 
where itYUR  is the youth (15-24) unemployment rate of country i in year t, and itX is a set of 
control variables described in the previous section: real GDP growth rate, share of exports in 
GDP, share of agriculture, industry and construction in GVA, share of public debt in GDP, tax rate, 
share of skilled among the total labour force (15-64), share of temporary employment (15-64), 
personal remittances received as percentage of GDP and median age of the population in the 
basic model specification, with additional variables in the supplementary model specification: 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score, Economic Freedom Index for regulation, dummy 
variables indicating policy change within the retirement legislation that limited eligibility for 
early retirement and policy change within the employment protection legislation that increased 
the EPL index, the share of young people (15-24) living in households with very low work 
intensity, the share of home ownership within a population, and the share of young people (20-
29) still living with their parents.14 
 
However, in order to disentangle factors that may affect only the youth unemployment, we 
separately estimate the model for the adult (25-64) unemployment rate: 
ititiit XAUR    (2) 
where itAUR  is the adult (25-64) unemployment rate of country i in year t, and itX is the same 
set of control variables as in the original model (1), apart from those variables that are 
presumed to be strictly connected with youth labour market, i.e., the share of young people (15-
24) living in households with very low work intensity, the share of home ownership within a 
population, and the share of young people (20-29) still living with their parents.15 
 
Also, in order to test whether the model works for different specifications of youth 
unemployment, we use the NEET (not in employment, education, and training) rate for the age 
group 15-24 as a dependent variable in additional robustness check: 
ititiit XNEET    (3) 
where itNEET  is the youth (15-24) NEET rate of country i in year t, and itX is the same set of 
control variables as in the previous two model specifications (1 and 2). 
 
We estimate all three models for all three samples, with further inclusion of the ratio of youth 
and adult unemployment rate as the dependent variable during robustness checks. This means 
that we estimate 30 different models in total, using both fixed and random effects estimators. In 
order to establish which estimator is more appropriate for the specific model we use the 
Hausman test. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test says that the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent which means that the fixed effects estimator is consistent and preferred, although it 
is usually less efficient. 
 
                                                            
14 For additional information please refer to Table 1. 
15 The same applies if instead of the adult unemployment rate we use the ratio of youth (15-24) and adult (25-64) 
unemployment rate. 
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There is also a possibility that the panel data exhibit a non-stationary time trend. Thus, we 
employ panel unit root tests to determine whether the main variables in our models are 
stationary or not. Panel-based unit root tests are performed for each variable and the results for 
dependent variables are shown in Table 2.16 The null hypothesis states that all panels contain 
unit roots; whereas the alternative hypothesis claims that at least one panel is stationary. In all 
cases, except in one case of the adult unemployment rate, the hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
rejected at conventional statistical significance levels. 
 
Table 2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
  YUR AUR RATIO NEET 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic 
p-
valu
e 
Inverse chi-
squared(56) Total 128.76 0.00 71.74 0.08 110.65 0.00 144.43 0.00 
Inverse chi-
squared(30) "High" 70.82 0.00 40.76 0.09 49.84 0.01 48.14 0.02 
Inverse chi-
squared(26) "Low" 57.95 0.00 30.99 0.23 60.81 0.00 96.29 0.00 
 
Notes: YUR – youth (15-24) unemployment rate; AUR – adult (25-64) unemployment rate; RATIO – ratio 
of youth (15-24) and adults (25-64) unemployment rate; NEET – NEET youth (15-24) rate. Fisher-type 
unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Empirical results and discussion 
 
The estimation results for the youth unemployment rate as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 3, for both the entire sample and subsamples for the high  youth 
unemployment  rate and low  youth  unemployment  rate  countries. In each case three different 
model specifications are estimated. Hausman test suggests the use of the fixed-effects estimator 
in all our model specifications.17 This means that we control for the unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics of each country in our models. Also, the ‘rho’ indicator, or the interclass 
correlation, suggests that more than 90 percent of the variance is due to differences across 
panels whereas the within R2 further suggests the use of the fixed-effects estimator. Both time 
and country effects appear to be jointly statistically significant in all estimated models, except 
the year effects in one model specification.18 Let us start with the results for the total EU-28 
sample (Table 3). 
 
As expected, real GDP growth rate has a negative effect on the height of youth unemployment 
rate. As for the structure of the economy, only the share of construction sector in GVA strongly 
negatively affects youth unemployment rate, i.e., in countries with higher share of the 
construction sector the unemployment rate is lower. This is a somewhat surprising result given 
                                                            
16 The results for other variables are not presented owing to space limitations but can be obtained upon request. 
17 This article reports only the results of the models estimated with the more “appropriate” estimator, as suggested by 
the Hausman test. All the remaining estimates can be obtained upon request.  
18 They are not presented owing to space limitations but can be obtained upon request. 
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that, on average, Spain, Romania and Slovakia, along with Cyprus, have the highest share of the 
construction sector in GVA and exhibit high average (youth) unemployment rates (Figure 1). On 
the other hand, the lowest share of the construction sector, besides Hungary, is found in 
Germany, Denmark and Netherlands, which have rather low youth unemployment rates (Figure 
1). Apparently, when examining a longer period and adding other control variables in the model 
the construction sector shows to be important in lowering youth unemployment rate. This result 
is noteworthy given that there are some studies (Eichhorst et al., 2013b) suggesting the 
opposite, i.e., that the higher share of the construction sector in the economy increases youth 
unemployment. Actually, this might have happened in some of the countries during recent 
recession, but since we controlled for that in our models, it seems that construction sector 
actually boosts employment in a longer period. Namely, the construction sector share in GVA 
(GDP), together with employment, was booming in most of these countries until the start of the 
crisis whereas in many countries it recovered rather well after the crisis and certainly could 
employ younger workforce (Banerji et al., 2014).  
 
Although insignificant in the first two model specifications, it seems that higher share of exports 
of goods and services in GDP brings down youth unemployment rates. Similar applies to the 
share of agriculture in GVA, whereas the share of industry (except construction) in GVA seems to 
increase youth unemployment rate. The share of the public debt in GDP also increases youth 
unemployment rate. Tax rate, or labour costs, as expected, lead to higher youth unemployment 
rate as well. Although insignificant, higher share of the skilled among the labour force leads to a 
decrease of youth unemployment rate. Flexibility of the labour legislation, proxied by the share 
of temporary employment contracts, leads to lower unemployment rates. This result is expected, 
since youths are more often employed on temporary contracts (O’Higgins, 2012). For example, 
the average share of temporary contracts for the employed youths (15-24) is 32 percent in EU-
28 in the observed period (2002-2014), while for the employed working-age population (15-64) 
this amounts to only 11 percent. Personal remittances, although insignificant, seem to increase 
youth unemployment rates; while the median age of the population decreases it insignificantly.  
 
Adding supplementary policy or institutional variables brings some interesting results. For 
example, the effect of personal remittances becomes significant, and still positive in explaining 
youth unemployment rate. It also seems that in countries with higher perceived corruption 
there is higher youth unemployment. Similarly, countries with stronger regulation appear to 
have higher youth unemployment rates, although not significantly. Although expected, these 
results are highly important given that they are not usually empirically confirmed in the 
literature on youth unemployment in Europe. Moreover, (dummy) policy variables, while 
insignificant, show that the decreased eligibility for early retirement lowers youth 
unemployment rate whereas policy variable indicating an increase of the EPL index increases 
youth unemployment rate. The former result could seem surprising given that the general 
perception is that more older workers on the labour market means more younger workers who 
are not able to get a job. However, recent literature actually suggests that there is no competition 
between younger and older workers on the labour market (Eichhorst et al., 2013b). 
 
The last model specification for the entire EU sample suggests that the effects of the structure of 
the economy, i.e., the share of exports of goods and services in GDP and share of industrial sector 
in GVA become statistically significant, and the same is true for the effect of the policy variable 
indicating the decreased eligibility for early retirement. The effect of the corruption perception 
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loses its statistical significance, while the effect of the regulation changes its direction of impact. 
However, it seems that countries where youths live in households with low work intensity, 
where there is high percentage of home ownership or where high share of the population aged 
20-29 still lives with their parents have higher youth unemployment rate. Apparently, additional 
characteristics of EU countries, mainly related to youth population and perhaps even taking 
family and cultural legacies in different countries into account, are highly important in 
explaining (high) youth unemployment rates in Europe. 
 
However, previous results should be taken only as a starting point for further evaluation of the 
factors that affect youth unemployment in Europe. In this paper we proceed by estimating the 
same model specifications on two different subsamples: subsample with high average long-term 
youth unemployment rate and the subsample with low average long-term youth unemployment 
rate. In order to preserve space, we will comment only on the results that differ from the original 
estimations presented in the first three columns of Table 3. 
 
In the case of high  youth  unemployment  rate sample real GDP growth rate is important 
(significant) for explaining youth unemployment rate only in the last model specification. Out of 
the variables explaining the structure of the economy, only the share of construction in GVA 
lowers youth unemployment rate with statistical significance. The same, with the opposite 
direction of influence, is true for the share of public debt in GDP. Tax rate has lost its statistical 
significance, while in the case of the last model specification for low youth unemployment rate 
countries, the share of the skilled labour force actually increases youth unemployment rate. This 
is probably the consequence of the uneven distribution of the skilled labour force among EU 
countries in comparison to their (youth) unemployment rate. Also, high share of the skilled 
labour force among active population accompanied with high (youth) unemployment rate could 
suggest that skills mismatch is present on the labour market (Quintini et al., 2007; Brada et al., 
2014; O’Reilly et al., 2015). Additionally, the share of temporary contracts among total 
employment seems to increase, rather than decrease, youth unemployment rate in countries 
with low average youth unemployment rate. This is in accordance with the study by O’Higgins 
(2012) who argues that the employment loss for youths, after the recession, was smaller in 
countries with stronger, not weaker, employment protection legislation index. Also, in these 
countries the effect of the population age becomes significant – on average, the older the 
population, the lower the youth unemployment rate. 
 
An even more interesting result appears when we look at the coefficient for personal 
remittances. While in the model specification for the total sample as well as for high  youth 
unemployment rate countries this variable has a significant and rather strong negative effect on 
youth unemployment rate (by increasing it), in the case of low  youth  unemployment  rate 
countries it mostly loses its significance, but has a negative sign. This result suggests the 
importance of emigration in the case of high  youth unemployment  rate countries, where high 
transfers from abroad seem to hold back employment serving as an income cushion in the case 
of unemployment without the right to other welfare benefits, which is especially present on the 
youth labour market. In low youth unemployment rate countries this does not seem to be very 
important and it works in the opposite direction, by decreasing unemployment rates. This 
suggests that the emigration in these countries serves more to decrease the base of the active 
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population, and probably of the total unemployment,19 but also that the income received is used 
for better purposes, such as education or starting a business, that increase the prospects of 
employment. 
 
However, the most visible differences between the high  and low  youth  unemployment  rate 
countries appear in the model specifications with additional variables. As is seems, corruption 
perception index is significantly increasing youth unemployment rate only in the former set of 
countries. However, the direction of impact, although insignificant, is the same in low  youth 
unemployment rate countries. Even though the variable used here is a subjective measure, i.e., it 
measures the perceived level of corruption in a country, it seems that no matter the economic 
structure, geographical position, or the population structure, higher level of corruption increases 
unemployment. This should be no surprise given that higher level of corruption reduces 
productivity and investment efficiency, increases prices, and distorts the allocation of resources 
in general (Tanzi, 1998; Lambsdorff, 2006; Swaleheen, 2007; Budak and Vizek, 2015). This 
variable potentially indicates the importance of the public sector within a country, which is often 
closed to “outsiders”, including younger workers, and thus can further increase youth 
unemployment rate. It could also indicate the possibility of a fairly high share of the informal 
sector on the labour market which again could indicate higher youth unemployment. Dummy 
variable for early retirement has the same effect in high youth unemployment rate sample as in 
total sample, whereas in low youth unemployment rate sample it loses its statistical significance 
and seems to lead to an increase in youth unemployment rates. Similar holds true for the labour 
legislation reform.  
 
In both subsamples the variable indicating work intensity of the youth households lost its 
statistical significance, whereas share of home ownership within a population, and the share of 
young people still living with their parents increases youth unemployment rate only in the case 
of high youth unemployment  rate countries. These two variables are insignificant in low youth 
unemployment  rate sample but seem to decrease youth unemployment rate, which is a rather 
unexpected result. Namely, the exiting literature (O’Reilly et al., 2015) points to family legacies 
of long-term unemployment as an important factor to be taken into account when examining 
youth unemployment. Yet, our results suggest that this is not the same in every country. 
Apparently, in countries that experience high youth unemployment it is important to look at the 
wider picture that includes the labour market status of the household members, possibilities for 
young people to live outside their parental home, as well as what subdues their mobility within 
the country, with home ownership being one of the possibilities. Sometimes, this is not even in 
the domain of the economic policy, but different actors should be included in dealing with these 
specific issues. As already mentioned, these variables could also reflect cultural differences 
between different EU countries. 
 
 
                                                            
19 See Kelly et al., 2014 for the case of Ireland. 
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Robustness checks 
Model consistency on different dependent variables 
 
Although previous results suggest that there are some common variables that explain youth 
unemployment rates in EU member states, one has to wonder if these indicators are responsible 
for the explanation of the overall unemployment as well. Thus, we have also tested our first two 
model specifications presented in Table 3 on the adult (25-64) unemployment rate.20 
 
As expected, the results resemble those in Table 3. However, most of the statistically significant 
variables have stronger effect on youth (15-24) than on adult (25-64) unemployment rate 
(Table 4). For instance, the effect of the real GDP growth rate is of the same direction of impact 
in both cases, but with a higher (negative) coefficient in the case of youth unemployment rate. 
This again points to stronger procyclicality of youth unemployment rate. The main difference 
can be found in the second model specification where the effect of policy variable indicating the 
increase of EPL index suggests statistically significant positive effect on the adult unemployment 
rate (it increases it) for both the total and low unemployment rate countries sample. 
 
Given that the effect of our variables is similar in the case of youth and adult unemployment rate, 
perhaps it would be worth checking how the models work in the case of the ratio between youth 
(15-24) and adult (25-64) unemployment rate, i.e., does the same set of determinants that 
affects the youth unemployment rate affect the relationship between unemployment rates 
between different age groups (Figure 2). These results are presented in Table 5. 
 
As it seems, apart from different “appropriateness” of the estimator, in the case of the ratio of 
youth (15-24) and adult (25-64) unemployment rate as the dependent variable, most of our 
variables from previous model specifications lost their statistical significance. It appears that 
only variables indicating the “structure” of the economy have an effect on this ratio. Namely, 
both the share of industry as well as the share of the construction sector in GVA increase the 
ratio between youth (15-24) and adult (25-64) unemployment rate. Apparently, although the 
share of the construction sector in the economy decreases both the youth and adult 
unemployment rate, it tends to increase the ratio between the two suggesting again that youths 
are probably disproportionately employed by this sector. In low  youth  unemployment  rate 
countries, the ratio also increases with the share of public debt in GDP, while it decreases with 
the share of skilled labour force, median age and policy variables indicating early retirement 
decrease and EPL increase. 
                                                            
20 The third model specification is left out in this instance since these additional variables are associated explicitly 
with youth population. 
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Table 3 Estimation results for youth unemployment rate (YUR) 
 Total  “High”  “Low” 
 (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
real GDP gr. 
rate (%) -0.257** (-2.26) -0.288** (-2.47) -0.349*** (-3.59) -0.144 (-0.86) -0.170 (-1.00) -0.311** (-2.22) -0.233** (-2.64) -0.317*** (-4.12) -0.362*** (-3.23) 
exports in 
GDP (%) -0.081 (-1.13) -0.060 (-0.83) -0.149** (-2.76) -0.011 (-0.13) 0.027 (0.45) -0.114 (-0.92) -0.069 (-1.15) -0.056 (-0.73) -0.079 (-0.66) 
agriculture 
in GVA (%) -0.039 (-0.09) -0.148 (-0.31) -1.138 (-1.12) -0.294 (-0.41) -0.663 (-0.85) -1.713 (-1.50) 0.432 (0.52) 0.570 (0.63) 0.885 (0.80) 
industry in 
GVA (%) 0.027 (0.07) 0.155 (0.42) 0.561* (2.00) 0.325 (0.50) 0.631 (1.08) 0.608 (1.52) 0.152 (0.54) 0.241 (1.00) 0.618 (1.74) 
construc. in 
GVA (%) -2.009*** (-3.93) -1.984*** (-3.73) -1.880*** (-4.38) -1.585* (-2.02) -1.171 (-1.65) -1.733** (-2.78) -1.439** (-2.68) -1.539** (-2.59) -1.733* (-1.90) 
public debt 
in GDP (%) 0.171*** (3.75) 0.148*** (2.86) 0.131*** (2.85) 0.260*** (4.81) 0.249*** (5.08) 0.171** (2.63) 0.111** (2.59) 0.083 (1.73) 0.138*** (3.64) 
tax rate (%) 0.552** (2.58) 0.387* (1.97) 0.506** (2.06) 0.185 (0.63) 0.002 (0.01) 0.577 (1.53) 0.404 (1.74) 0.243 (0.85) 0.378 (0.84) 
skilled 
labour force 
(15-64) (%) 
-0.170 (-0.81) 0.004 (0.03) -0.323 (-1.61) -0.836 (-1.33) -0.228 (-0.53) 0.492 (0.65) -0.184 (-1.30) -0.165 (-1.11) -0.604** (-2.75) 
temporary 
employ. (15-
64) (%) 
-0.730** (-2.26) -0.817** (-2.74) -0.801** (-2.60) -0.950** (-2.64) -0.975*** (-2.98) -0.983** (-2.85) 0.558* (1.98) 0.585 (1.71) 0.481 (1.45) 
personal 
remittances 
(% of GDP) 
0.686 (1.70) 0.797** (2.13) 2.124** (2.56) 1.104** (2.28) 1.216** (2.92) 3.096*** (3.66) -1.606* (-2.07) -1.035 (-1.47) 0.019 (0.02) 
median age -0.791 (-1.15) -0.590 (-0.77) -0.569 (-0.59) -1.186 (-1.52) -1.351 (-1.60) -1.095 (-0.74) -2.920*** (-4.71) -3.111*** (-3.09) -3.903** (-2.61) 
CPI score   -1.424* (-1.96) -1.352 (-1.60)   -3.314*** (-3.26) -3.025* (-1.87)   -1.587 (-1.53) -2.264 (-1.23) 
EFI – reg.   -0.033 (-0.02) 0.681 (0.49)   -0.063 (-0.03) 1.187 (0.77)   -0.463 (-0.27) 1.808 (0.61) 
early retir. 
decrease   -0.184 (-0.40) -0.839** (-2.19)   -0.122 (-0.18) -1.254** (-2.37)   0.156 (0.42) 0.180 (0.33) 
EPL increase   1.275 (1.56) 0.648 (0.69)   1.415 (1.48) 0.987 (1.02)   0.337 (1.07) -0.190 (-0.26) 
low work 
intensity HH 
(15-24) (%) 
    0.553** (2.47)     0.513 (1.54)     -0.173 (-1.33) 
home 
ownership 
(%) 
    0.356*** (3.32)     0.506** (2.78)     -0.043 (-0.28) 
living with 
parents (20-
29) (%) 
    0.246** (2.72)     0.355* (1.92)     -0.012 (-0.11) 
N 346 325 226 187 178 123 159 147 103 
sigma_u 12.130 10.903 13.676 14.178 14.514 18.012 10.750 9.495 12.571 
sigma_e 3.653 3.541 2.817 4.020 3.793 2.960 2.227 2.098 1.986 
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 Total  “High”  “Low” 
 (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
rho 0.917 0.905 0.959 0.926 0.936 0.974 0.959 0.953 0.976 
R2 within 0.713 0.730  0.833 0.783 0.804  0.886  0.768 0.811  0.868 
R2 between 0.004 0.001 0.201 0.000 0.012 0.071 0.107 0.040 0.016 
R2 overall 0.042 0.089 0.238 0.121 0.150 0.160 0.000 0.031 0.027 
F-test for 
joint sign. 
(panel) 
37.151*** 32.201*** 23.458*** 28.143*** 24.094*** 10.573*** 23.185*** 19.810*** 6.934*** 
F-test for 
joint sign. 
(year) 
2.665*** 2.578*** 3.446*** 2.011** 1.976** 0.985 4.846*** 5.266*** 3.909*** 
Hausman 
test 101.14*** 51.20*** 110.54*** 79.49*** 56.73*** 562.94*** 389.62*** 98.60*** 224.63*** 
Notes:  FE- fixed effects; RE – random effects. t statistics in parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; A constant is also 
included but not reported.  
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 4 Estimation results for adult unemployment rate (AUR) 
 Total  “High”  “Low” 
 (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
real GDP gr. rate (%) -0.090* (-1.74) -0.113** (-2.21) -0.029 (-0.36) -0.062 (-0.86) -0.083* (-1.94) -0.102*** (-4.37) 
exports in GDP (%) -0.015 (-0.65) -0.009 (-0.42) -0.003 (-0.08) 0.003 (0.11) -0.006 (-0.24) 0.003 (0.13) 
agriculture in GVA (%) -0.061 (-0.31) -0.081 (-0.35) -0.105 (-0.43) -0.193 (-0.66) -0.579 (-1.53) -0.563 (-1.13) 
industry in GVA (%) -0.092 (-0.72) -0.029 (-0.21) 0.093 (0.41) 0.254 (1.18) -0.021 (-0.13) 0.001 (0.01) 
construc. in GVA (%) -1.135*** (-5.62) -1.122*** (-5.53) -0.974** (-2.68) -0.791** (-2.65) -0.852*** (-3.51) -0.904*** (-3.72) 
public debt in GDP (%) 0.069*** (3.10) 0.055** (2.49) 0.110*** (3.68) 0.098*** (5.81) 0.033 (1.27) 0.015 (0.50) 
tax rate (%) 0.247** (2.17) 0.162* (1.75) 0.126 (0.88) 0.039 (0.28) 0.050 (0.58) -0.041 (-0.48) 
skilled labour force (15-64) (%) -0.062 (-0.76) 0.008 (0.14) -0.301 (-1.31) -0.050 (-0.33) -0.058 (-0.74) -0.056 (-0.62) 
temporary employ. (15-64) (%) -0.366*** (-3.12) -0.406*** (-3.91) -0.470*** (-3.30) -0.489*** (-3.91) 0.211 (1.37) 0.196 (1.18) 
personal remittances (% of GDP) 0.374** (2.09) 0.434** (2.64) 0.462* (1.97) 0.552*** (2.98) -0.381* (-1.89) -0.205 (-1.21) 
median age -0.165 (-0.45) -0.082 (-0.22) -0.241 (-0.68) -0.225 (-0.77) -1.198* (-1.94) -1.111 (-1.52) 
CPI score   -0.694** (-2.27)   -1.729*** (-3.96)   -0.412 (-1.16) 
EFI – reg.   0.084 (0.13)   0.314 (0.34)   -0.570 (-0.66) 
early retir. decrease   0.016 (0.08)   -0.021 (-0.07)   0.154 (0.74) 
EPL increase   0.541* (1.73)   0.405 (1.16)   0.703*** (4.08) 
N 346 325 187 178 159 147 
sigma_u 5.755 5.175 7.068 7.270 3.525 3.383 
sigma_e 1.490 1.401 1.609 1.445 1.007 0.918 
rho 0.937 0.932 0.951 0.962 0.925 0.931 
R2 within 0.747  0.768  0.816  0.844  0.747  0.803 
R2 between 0.060 0.013 0.065 0.001 0.046 0.035 
R2 overall 0.010 0.043 0.035 0.079 0.034 0.076 
F-test for joint sign. (panel) 42.505*** 35.988*** 43.903*** 36.761*** 11.845*** 6.698*** 
F-test for joint sign. (year) 1.721* 2.036** 0.913 1.124 2.698*** 3.836*** 
Hausman test -5845.19† 263.18*** -23.39† 404.98*** 136.62*** 87.09*** 
Notes:  FE- fixed effects; RE – random effects. t statistics in parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. A constant is also 
included but not reported. † - chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5 Estimation results for the ratio of youth (15­24) and adult (25­64) unemployment rate  
 Total    “High”  “Low” 
 (RE) (RE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
real GDP gr. rate (%) -0.008 (-0.85) -0.005 (-0.58) -0.005 (-0.65) -0.002 (-0.27) -0.025 (-1.50) -0.027 (-1.50) 
 exports in GDP (%) -0.004 (-0.66) -0.003 (-0.54) -0.002 (-0.48) -0.001 (-0.34) -0.007 (-1.10) -0.006 (-0.87) 
agriculture in GVA (%) 0.011 (0.51) 0.011 (0.60) -0.008 (-0.26) -0.016 (-0.60) 0.314* (1.89) 0.265 (1.58) 
industry in GVA (%) 0.033* (1.72) 0.028* (1.95) 0.025 (0.90) 0.016 (0.71) 0.039** (2.60) 0.038* (1.90) 
construc. in GVA (%) 0.078** (2.47) 0.070*** (2.85) 0.048* (1.84) 0.046* (1.94) 0.106** (2.38) 0.116** (2.45) 
public debt in GDP (%) 0.002 (0.58) 0.001 (0.44) -0.003 (-0.94) -0.002 (-0.81) 0.008** (2.68) 0.010*** (3.15) 
tax rate (%) -0.007 (-0.47) -0.003 (-0.21) -0.019 (-1.12) -0.015 (-0.86) 0.074** (2.67) 0.083** (2.64) 
skilled labour force (15-64) (%) 0.000 (0.05) -0.002 (-0.24) 0.020 (1.51) 0.020 (1.01) -0.029*** (-3.74) -0.036** (-2.96) 
temporary employ. (15-64) (%) 0.009 (0.76) 0.010 (0.86) 0.016 (0.96) 0.018 (1.09) 0.037 (1.13) 0.050 (1.24) 
personal remittances (% of GDP) -0.026 (-1.19) -0.029 (-1.47) -0.002 (-0.08) -0.012 (-0.49) -0.115 (-1.07) -0.098 (-1.07) 
median age -0.051 (-1.17) -0.032 (-0.61) -0.008 (-0.15) -0.028 (-0.60) -0.167 (-1.70) -0.219* (-1.91) 
CPI score   0.083 (1.58)   0.095 (1.60)   -0.038 (-0.34) 
EFI – reg.   -0.113 (-0.95)   -0.048 (-0.29)   0.055 (0.36) 
early retir. decrease   -0.016 (-0.57)   0.025 (1.04)   -0.056* (-1.86) 
EPL increase   0.007 (0.11)   0.073 (0.83)   -0.177** (-2.78) 
N 346 325 187 178 159 147 
sigma_u 0.723 0.867 0.741 0.759 1.500 1.502 
sigma_e 0.262 0.262 0.222 0.218 0.270 0.274 
rho 0.884 0.916 0.917 0.923 0.969 0.968 
R2 within 0.239 0.245 0.346 0.372 0.422 0.439 
R2 between 0.017 0.024 0.040 0.002 0.494 0.442 
R2 overall 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.302 0.272 
F-test for joint sign. (panel) 68.376*** 61.689*** 35.586*** 33.139*** 35.853*** 32.553*** 
F-test for joint sign. (year) 2.382*** 1.958** 0.744 0.525 3.364*** 3.290*** 
Hausman test 13.49^ 7.47^ -56.79† 266.92*** -50.04† -245.55† 
Notes:  FE- fixed effects; RE – random effects. t statistics in parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. A constant is also 
included but not reported. ^ - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects suggests the use of random effects estimator instead of OLS estimator. † - 
chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Despite rather high youth unemployment rates (Figure 1), participation of youths (15-24) on the 
labour market is still rather low. In case of most EU countries the activity rate for youths (15-24) 
is below 40 percent, while the employment rate is usually below 30 percent. In light of this, 
measures such as the youth unemployment ratio (the number of those unemployed in the age 
group 15-24 divided by the total population aged 15 to 24) or the rate of young people "not in 
employment, education or training” - NEET rate - might map a better picture of the actual 
situation for youths on the labour market.21 That is why it is important to look at different 
indicators of the position of youths on the labour market, and not only on the unemployment 
rate. Since we have already controlled for the demographic situation of the country in our 
models, in order to check whether our model specification explains some other measure of the 
position of youths on the labour market, we have tested all our model specifications on the 
youth (15-24) NEET rate.22 Results are presented in Table 6. 
 
In the case of youth NEET rate, the “appropriateness” of the models is not the same as in the case 
of both youth and adult unemployment rate. Namely, the Hausman test gives preference to 
random effects estimation in three of the model specifications, while for one model specification 
“the model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test”. 
Apparently, explanatory variables in the case of youth unemployment and NEET rates are 
somewhat different, although the NEET rate is composed of the unemployed population as 
well.23 However, it seems that inactive population within the youth age-range (15-24), which is 
not a part of formal education system, cannot be explained with the same set of data as the one 
defined as unemployed. The only inferences from the model in this paper, as presented in Table 
6, are that, in general, higher real GDP growth rate, higher share of exports of goods and services 
and higher share of the construction sector in GVA lower the NEET rate, whereas higher share of 
agriculture in GVA, higher share of public debt in GDP and higher perceived corruption increase 
it. Also, this is mostly true for the total EU sample and high youth unemployment rate countries, 
whereas low youth unemployment rate countries exhibit somewhat different results. Among the 
structural characteristics, share of homeownership seems to increase NEET rates in the  total 
sample  and  high  youth  unemployment  rate  subsample.  Evidently, new set of explanatory 
variables should be added to the model if we want to explain the youth NEET rate across the EU. 
                                                            
21 Even though the youth unemployment rate might be high in one country, both the NEET rate and youth 
unemployment ratio could be higher in some other country, due to different age structure of the population or 
because of the high share of those inactive, but not in education. 
22 More on the concept of the NEET population is available in Elder (2015), while more on the NEET population in 
Europe can be found in Eurofound (2012) or in Sissons and Jones (2012). 
23 Eurofound (2012) reports that the largest subgroup of the NEET population are those who are conventionally 
unemployed. Other subgroups include the sick and disabled and young carers, as well as those taking time out and 
those constructively engaged in other activities such as art, music and self-directed learning. 
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Table 6 Estimation results for youth NEET rate  
 Total  “High”  “Low” 
 (RE) (RE) (FE) (RE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
real GDP gr. 
rate (%) -0.114*** (-2.78) -0.123*** (-2.76) -0.096*** (-2.95) -0.101* (-1.68) -0.109* (-1.88) -0.138*** (-3.09) -0.136 (-1.66) -0.133* (-1.87) -0.050 (-1.31) 
exports in 
GDP (%) -0.042** (-2.12) -0.033* (-1.91) -0.054* (-1.95) -0.080** (-2.06) -0.080** (-2.15) -0.042 (-0.82) -0.054 (-1.53) -0.006 (-0.28) -0.044 (-1.21) 
agriculture 
in GVA (%) 0.747*** (3.83) 0.572*** (2.75) 0.234 (0.81) 0.854*** (3.10) 0.795* (2.09) 0.085 (0.35) -0.032 (-0.07) -0.196 (-0.28) 0.016 (0.02) 
industry in 
GVA (%) 0.084 (0.89) 0.083 (1.16) 0.183* (2.01) 0.181 (1.62) 0.343** (2.56) 0.273** (2.22) 0.323 (1.04) 0.157 (0.84) 0.059 (0.29) 
construc. in 
GVA (%) -0.408** (-2.08) -0.491*** (-2.66) -0.772*** (-4.08) -0.337* (-1.71) -0.141 (-0.58) -0.500* (-1.82) -0.205 (-0.65) -0.349 (-1.65) -0.892*** (-4.23) 
public debt 
in GDP (%) 0.060*** (4.51) 0.043*** (3.44) 0.048*** (3.11) 0.049** (2.54) 0.061** (2.15) 0.027 (1.12) 0.065** (2.66) 0.028 (1.23) 0.045* (2.12) 
tax rate (%) -0.093 (-1.23) -0.120* (-1.92) 0.115 (1.22) -0.124 (-0.95) -0.171 (-1.29) 0.176** (2.29) 0.147 (0.85) -0.039 (-0.25) 0.101 (0.56) 
skilled 
labour force 
(15-64) (%) 
-0.042 (-0.66) 0.050 (1.00) -0.091 (-0.94) -0.143 (-1.20) -0.012 (-0.07) -0.106 (-0.40) -0.140 (-1.47) -0.150 (-1.71) -0.271*** (-6.21) 
temporary 
employ. (15-
64) (%) 
-0.169*** (-3.39) -0.170*** (-3.47) -0.055 (-0.48) -0.253*** (-3.50) -0.348*** (-3.96) -0.225** (-2.18) 0.602** (2.56) 0.479* (2.04) 0.239 (1.57) 
personal 
remittances 
(% of GDP) 
0.011 (0.06) -0.002 (-0.01) 0.355 (1.56) -0.045 (-0.20) -0.079 (-0.25) 0.789** (2.66) -0.038 (-0.07) 0.435 (0.92) 0.253 (0.67) 
median age -0.307 (-1.02) -0.037 (-0.14) -0.436 (-0.88) 0.223 (0.66) 0.169 (0.47) 0.328 (0.64) -1.662** (-2.39) -0.974 (-1.57) -2.241*** (-6.40) 
CPI score   -0.768*** (-2.85) -0.388 (-1.11)   -1.254** (-2.62) -1.154** (-2.15)   -0.562 (-0.82) -0.950 (-1.30) 
EFI – reg.   -0.607 (-1.12) 0.047 (0.09)   0.216 (0.34) 0.899* (1.88)   -2.254*** (-3.27) -0.112 (-0.12) 
early retir. 
decrease   0.003 (0.02) -0.251 (-1.50)   0.167 (1.02) -0.276 (-1.59)   -0.049 (-0.17) 0.059 (0.21) 
EPL increase   0.185 (0.57) -0.028 (-0.08)   -0.013 (-0.04) -0.026 (-0.07)   0.042 (0.07) -0.223 (-0.75) 
low work 
intensity HH 
(15-24) (%) 
    -0.017 (-0.19)     -0.070 (-0.58)     -0.090 (-0.76) 
home 
ownership 
(%) 
    0.094** (2.66)     0.143** (2.62)     -0.026 (-0.42) 
living with 
parents (20-
29) (%) 
    0.039 (0.86)     0.044 (0.71)     -0.028 (-0.31) 
N 346 325 226 187 178 123 159 147 103 
sigma_u 2.620 2.514 3.691 2.557 3.757 5.052 6.440 4.627 4.422 
sigma_e 1.672 1.578 1.094 1.553 1.494 0.997 1.587 1.395 1.010 
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 Total  “High”  “Low” 
 (RE) (RE) (FE) (RE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
rho 0.711 0.717 0.919 0.730 0.863 0.963 0.943 0.917 0.950 
R2 within 0.507 0.554 0.701  0.651 0.694  0.790  0.524  0.605  0.786 
R2 between 0.469 0.614 0.361 0.429 0.517 0.326 0.009 0.036 0.115 
R2 overall 0.475  0.605  0.396 0.471  0.533 0.380 0.023 0.071 0.192 
F-test for 
joint sign. 
(panel) 
28.752*** 26.329*** 23.668*** 29.206*** 21.924*** 12.645*** 11.774*** 10.862*** 3.685*** 
F-test for 
joint sign. 
(year) 
0.984 1.365 1.708* 1.517 1.349 1.937* 1.321 2.006** 1.535 
Hausman 
test 12.75^ 20.92^ 374.59*** 14.07^ 296.25*** -1620.61† 188.07*** 54.83*** 55.09*** 
Notes:  FE- fixed effects; RE – random effects. t statistics in parentheses. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. A constant is also 
included but not reported. ^ - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects suggests the use of random effects estimator instead of OLS estimator. † - 
chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Further examination of the models fit 
 
Given that Hausman test suggests that all of the model specifications in case of youth 
unemployment rate should be estimated by the fixed effect estimator, in order to analyse the 
effect of specific variables on youth unemployment rate in individual countries we have also 
calculated country-specific effects within our total sample and the two subsamples for the youth 
unemployment rate. The results are displayed in Table A.1 in Appendix. As already indicated in 
Table 3, country-specific constants are jointly statistically significant in all model specifications.  
 
In general, the fixed effects show the country-specific level of youth unemployment (over the 
total period) net of the overall effect of different set of variables on youth unemployment. For 
example, in Croatia, using the second model specification, average youth unemployment over 
the period, net of the overall effect, is estimated at 26.7 percent. This compares with an average 
youth unemployment rate for this country over the full period of 34.4 percent. By comparison, 
the corresponding figures for United Kingdom are 8.4 and 16.0 percent. These comparisons 
clearly suggest that the “overall effect” for youth unemployment is not constant across countries. 
Again, there are differences between samples and models specifications. This only confirms 
heterogeneity among EU member countries and the need to evaluate effects on youth 
unemployment rate separately for different groups(s) of countries or even individual countries. 
 
The robustness of the models for youth unemployment is also examined by comparing the 
observed youth unemployment rates with those obtained from the estimated models. 
Comparative figures by countries and years are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the 
Appendix. Due to some missing data, the predicted values could not have been estimated for all 
the countries in all the observed years. In general, predicted results suggest that the basic model 
as well as supplementary model with policy/institutional variables explain youth 
unemployment rate rather well (except in the case of Cyprus). Supplementary model with 
additional structural variables, i.e., the share of youths who live in households with low work 
intensity, the percentage of home ownership in a country and the share of the population aged 
20-29 that lives with their parents, on the other hand, seems to misexplain youth unemployment 
rate in EU countries, despite the statistical significance of these variables in the model. Again, 
there are big differences between countries; while in some of them the model seems to explain 
youth unemployment rate rather well in other it fails to do so.  
 
 
Potential limitations of the study 
 
Several additional caveats need to be mentioned here. First, one could argue that the division of 
the entire sample into high youth unemployment rate countries and low youth unemployment rate 
countries might seem somewhat arbitrary, potentially indicating that some different subsamples 
could provide different picture. However, these (groups of) countries proved to be (statistically) 
different in many aspects other than unemployment rates, thus justifying this potentially 
arbitrary division. Further, trying to control for many different aspects in our models, leads to a 
potential danger of multicollinearity between different covariates and even to a simultaneity 
bias. Nevertheless, this is for the main part solved by using the fixed-effects estimator. 
Additionally, we use “formal” EU definition of youths in the article as the population between 15 
and 24. However, due to certain specific features, such as the extension of higher education after 
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24 years in some countries, the upper age limit could be extended to 29 years of age. 
Alternatively, because the system of secondary education is non-dual, i.e., young people are 
rarely simultaneously present in both education and work in some countries, or because the 
rates of early school leaving ("drop-out") differ substantially between different EU countries, the 
lower limit in the definition of young people could be moved from 15 to 18 or 20. Even the 
unemployment within formal definition of youths could be divided between those aged 15-19 
and those aged 20-24. Of course, these alternative “measures” of youth unemployment would fit 
some countries better than others. Finally, better availability of the data would provide a better 
picture, even within the existing models.24 
 
 
Summary of results and conclusion 
 
Over the past few years, youth unemployment has crystallized as one of the main problems in 
the European Union as a whole, with special emphasis on certain member states. This is visible 
not only from the statistical data, but also from most of the sectoral strategic documents at both 
national and European level. A large set of programs and measures have been introduced to 
combat high youth unemployment, both on EU and member-state level. However, their 
outcomes are questionable, as they depend on the characteristics of each country. Yet, this 
heterogeneity among EU member countries is often not taken into account. 
 
This article uses a unique dataset for EU-28 countries in order to explore the main determinants 
of youth unemployment rates by panel data model estimation. The period used in the analysis is 
extended to 13 years, from 2002 to 2014, for which most of the data used in the empirical 
analysis are available. In this way, the main determinants of youth unemployment in European 
countries are explored in a longer perspective, not only during the recent recession. Further, the 
article takes into account heterogeneity between countries in youth unemployment rates, but 
also in different economic and non-economic indicators, estimating our models on two different 
subsamples: high  youth  unemployment  rate countries and low  youth  unemployment  rate 
countries. Our main dependent variable is unemployment rate for those aged 15-24, while for 
additional robustness check we tested our models on the adult (25-64) unemployment rate, the 
ratio of youth and adult unemployment rate, and youth (15-24) NEET rate.  
 
Apart from the generally accepted (macro) indicators that proved to be important in explaining 
high (youth) unemployment rates, such as real GDP growth rate or tax rate, we also test the 
dependence of youth unemployment rate in EU countries on additional indicators, the ones that 
are probably not the first to mention as culprits for high youth unemployment, but could be 
responsible as much as the macro variables, if not even more. For this purpose, we include, 
among other indicators, the perception of corruption index, index for economic regulation, low 
work intensity within the household of the youth population, the share of home ownership in a 
country, and living in a parental home for a longer period.  
                                                            
24 One could also argue that we did not take into account the dynamic nature of youth unemployment rate, i.e., the 
effect that past unemployment rate(s) has on its present value. This would imply that the “unemployment hysteresis” 
is present on European (youth) labour markets. However, given that the number of panels/countries (as well as 
years) is rather small in our model, standard dynamic panel estimators, such as Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimator, are not suitable in this case (see StataCorp. 2013). Also, the dynamic aspect is already covered by including 
time-fixed effects in our fixed- and random-effects estimations. 
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The presented main features of our model also illustrate the main contributions of this article. 
Namely, longer-term determinants of youth unemployment among EU countries, including the 
recent crisis, add to the literature by evaluating the main characteristics of the persistence of the 
youth unemployment problem in many European countries. Further, by estimating the models 
separately for countries that have experienced long periods of high youth unemployment and 
countries that have had significantly lower youth unemployment rates during the observed 
period, the article acknowledges heterogeneity between countries, and especially their labour 
markets. Finally, by adding the specific, non-economic, characteristics as explanatory variables 
into the model, we further extend the possible explanations of high youth unemployment rates 
in many EU countries. Some of these variables could actually reflect cultural differences between 
different EU member countries. 
 
The main results of the empirical estimation suggest that real GDP growth rate and the share of 
construction sector in GVA are the most important determinants of lowering youth 
unemployment rates, while the share of public debt in GDP is the most resistant variable that 
showed to increase youth unemployment in European countries. In general, where significant, 
all variables have stronger effect on youth than on the adult unemployment rate. However, the 
direction of influence is mostly the same in both cases. Interestingly, when assessing the ratio of 
youth and adult unemployment rate, both the share of industry and construction sector in GVA 
tend to increase it. Hence, the share of the construction sector in the economy decreases both 
the youth and adult unemployment rate, but it increases the ratio between the two suggesting 
that youths are probably disproportionately employed by this sector. Share of temporary 
employment within the economy seems to decrease youth unemployment, whereas share of 
received personal remittances increases youth unemployment, at least in high  youth 
unemployment  rate countries. Corruption perception index (CPI) appears to have a rather 
negative effect on the youth unemployment as well. Variables indicating the share of young 
people (15-24) living in households with very low work intensity, share of home ownership 
within a population, and the share of young people (20-29) still living with their parents prove 
to be rather important in explaining high unemployment rates in high youth unemployment rate 
countries and in the total sample, while they were insignificant (and negative) in the low youth 
unemployment  rate countries sample. However, it seems that adding these last three variables 
into the model the predictability of the estimation is drifting further away from the original 
observations of youth unemployment rates.  
 
Although presented results are based on a rather simple model and publicly available data, there 
are still some important messages that can be extracted from them, especially when determining 
and evaluating different measures taken in order to mitigate (high) youth unemployment rates 
in Europe. Yes, one could always say that the solution is simple and that all we need to reduce 
unemployment is to boost economic growth (van Ours, 2015). Although true, this recipe is 
neither entirely complete nor far-reaching. Namely, even in the periods of economic growth 
some EU members have had rather high youth unemployment. Our results suggest that there are 
huge differences between countries in youth unemployment rates, but also in different economic 
and non-economic indicators. High and low  youth  unemployment  rate  countries differ 
substantially when trying to explain youth unemployment by the same set of variables, which 
confirms our assumption that EU countries should not be observed as one entity, and the need to 
divide the sample in (at least) two parts. Although the European Union has put a lot of effort in 
dealing with the youth unemployment in recent years, those measures could prove not to work 
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well in all countries. We have already pointed to a different economic structure and different age 
structure of the youths present on labour markets in different EU countries, but there are many 
more heterogeneities not visible at first sight. Sometimes, this is not even in the domain of the 
economic policy, but different actors should be included in dealing with the specific issues of 
high youth unemployment and youth NEET rates. Of course, this paper is just the “tip of the 
iceberg” on this issue, while more research, both in the domain of macro, but especially 
microeconometrics using individual-level data, is needed. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Country­specific effects from the panel estimation of youth unemployment rate 
Total “High” “Low”  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
BE (.) (.) (.)    (.) (.) (.) 
BG 23.837*** 16.391*** 2.774 (.) (.) (.)    
CZ 15.561*** 10.380* -1.004    0.888 -8.162 -19.257** 
DK -1.257 2.127 11.481***    -10.398*** -7.779*** -8.619** 
DE -4.300 -1.904 -3.626    -10.951*** -10.229*** -12.387* 
EE 27.998*** 22.107*** 21.544***    21.053*** 14.233** 16.724 
IE 12.446** 9.308 6.006    -11.235* -16.304** -16.199 
EL 18.655*** 15.531*** 9.372 -7.12 -3.265 7.048    
ES 50.163*** 48.445*** 42.471*** 35.168*** 38.890*** 41.998***    
FR 13.147*** 13.920*** 21.912*** -3.104 7.51 26.724**    
HR 30.274*** 26.668*** 6.243 7.047* 12.507*** 8.37    
IT 11.467** 10.279** -1.589 -17.076*** -6.39 5.561    
CY 24.418*** 20.318*** 30.782***    -3.952 -13.013 -3.484 
LV 20.182*** 16.663*** 8.137* 1.044 5.634 4.914    
LT 21.587*** 14.576*** 4.146 0.693 -2.236 -7.222    
LU 22.465*** 20.049*** 33.648***    16.717*** 12.602* 21.937 
HU 5.250* 2.820 -9.885** -21.320*** -14.710*** -12.216    
MT 13.101** 8.446 6.331    5.294 -2.264 -4.392 
NL 7.021** 8.890*** 17.086***    -14.183*** -14.055*** -11.659** 
AT -2.056 0.479 -0.631    -9.077*** -9.258*** -17.831*** 
PL 35.936*** 33.428*** 21.644*** 12.524** 15.188** 23.978**    
PT 18.121*** 19.349*** 9.891 -9.901 5.173 19.88    
RO 15.287*** 10.327* -10.259 -15.459** -11.674* -8.873    
SI 16.382*** 15.101*** 3.583    -3.398 -8.564* -9.347* 
SK 28.589*** 23.044*** 6.599 -8.003 -6.332 4.81    
FI 23.484*** 24.436*** 29.980*** 11.472** 23.404*** 36.248***    
SE 22.140*** 23.653*** 32.971*** 5.876 20.167*** 42.456***    
UK 7.830** 8.366** 10.280**    -0.565 -0.528 1.877 
Notes: Dependent variable: youth (15-24) unemployment rate. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure  A.1  Mean  observed  vs.  mean  predicted  values  from  the  panel  estimation  of  youth 
unemployment rate by countries (EU­28 sample) 
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Figure  A.2  Mean  observed  vs.  mean  predicted  values  from  the  panel  estimation  of  youth 
unemployment rate by years (EU­28 sample) 
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